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Abstract
This article tests experimentally whether a high degree of col-
lusion on advertisement expenditures facilitate tacit price collu-
sion in duopoly markets. Two environments are tested, in which
the size of the spillover between advertising expenditures is var-
ied. The results show that the competitiveness of advertising
and prices are signi¯cantly higher when the advertising spillover
is higher than the price spillover than when advertising spillover
is lower than the price spillover. In the second environment, a
higher degree of advertising collusion leads for experienced play-
ers to a higher degree of price collusion. In the ¯rst environment,
players behave at most semi-collusively, that is, if at all, they
collude on advertising, but compete over prices.
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11 Introduction
This article analyzes the relation between two important issues of indus-
trial organizations, advertising decisions and tacit collusion. Particu-
larly, I will investigate whether a high degree of collusion on advertising
expenditures facilitates tacit price collusion. My concern about this issue
is that advertising expenditures may be used to signal ¯rms' intentions
with respect to the competitiveness of prices. For this purpose, a simple
experimental setup is developed which allows to test this question.
The e®ect of advertising for price or quantity competition has been
subject to well-established literature (e.g., Comanor & Wilson, 1979).
The main discussion has been attributed to the question whether ad-
vertising increases or decreases the concentration of markets, that is,
whether advertisements o®er di®erentiation opportunities for products
of new market entrants (e.g., Nelson, 1974, Klein & Le²er, 1981), or
whether established brands create market entry barriers (e.g., Cubbin,
1981, Schmalensee, 1981, 1983). Following the seminal articles by Sa-
lop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980), contemporary studies focus
on the relation between advertising and price dispersion on markets for
homogeneous goods (e.g., Baye & Morgan, 2001, Iyer & Pazgal, 2003).
Pricing is examined when ¯rms can advertise them at a high cost on
markets with two types of customer, informed customers who buy at
the cheapest price and naive customers who choose the product ran-
domly. Here, the analysis reveals that ¯rms optimally mix the provision
and non-provision of information on prices. Indeed, experimental stud-
ies by Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2006a, 2006b) ¯nd price dispersion
for homogeneous products, when ¯rms can advertise their prices. How-
ever, the frequency with which they choose to advertise is higher than
predicted, resulting in advertising strategies that are too aggressive.
I consider a setting where ¯rms decide on advertising and prices se-
quentially; ¯rms do not advertise the products' prices, but run some
kind of promotion campaign. Knowing the entire vector of advertising
choices, they decide on prices. Hence, ¯rms can impede competition in
two dimensions, advertising and prices. Along both dimensions, ¯rms
may collude, that is, they increase advertising expenditures (prices) such
that they jointly maximize their pro¯t. Moreover, the advertising deci-
sion can be considered as a commitment device indicating an attempt
to collude on prices. The issue of tacit collusion has been a major ¯eld
for experimental industrial organization (see the survey article by Holt,
1995, and Huck, Normann & Oechssler, 2004, Engel, 2007, for a con-
temporary overview) o®ering ample evidence (Selten & StÄ ocker, 1986)
of stable cooperation even in the case of a known ¯nite number of in-
teractions. Despite the lack of precise empirical data on price collusion,
2the experimental method o®ers the additional advantage of control for a
certain aspect that facilitates or impedes collusion. Previous examples
analyze the e®ect of cheap talk communication on cooperation rates
(e.g., Holt & Davis, 1990, and Cason & Davis, 1995) or the impact of
¯rm mergers on cooperation rates (e.g., Fonseca & Normann, 2008).
Overall, Bertrand price competition tends to induce a higher degree of
collusion than Cournot quantity competition (Suetens & Potters, 2007).
Closely related to my study are recent laboratory experiments that ex-
plore whether cooperative research and development expenditures leads
to price collusion (e.g., Suetens, 2007). They test a standardized ver-
sion of the two-stage model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and
Kamien et al. (1992), where two ¯rms compete over prices and sell
di®erentiated products. The degree of price collusion is compared be-
tween a treatment, where duopolists form binding contracts over research
and development expenditures { which reduce production costs { and
a treatment where no contracts could be formed. Results indicate that
the degree of price collusion is signi¯cantly higher when contracts are
formed than when no contracts have been formed and when no contracts
could be formed.
In this paper I will apply a modi¯ed version of the two-stage model
of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to investigate the relation be-
tween pricing decisions and advertisement decisions. Firms competing
for di®erentiated products run promotion campaigns. Advertising ex-
penditures of one ¯rm increases the demand for its own as well as for
competing products. Thus, unlike earlier experimental studies on the ef-
fect of capacity commitments on price setting (e.g., Davis, 1999, Muren,
2000, Anderhub et al., 2003), there is a \double" spillover e®ect in my
setting: ¯rst in terms of prices (i.e., increasing the own price increases
the demand for the opponent's product), and second in advertising ex-
penditures (i.e., increasing own expenditures increases the demand for
the product of the opponent). Treatment conditions will vary the size
of the spillover e®ect for advertising expenditures (henceforth denoted
as investments). It is important to stress an important di®erence be-
tween pricing decisions and investment decisions. Between each invest-
ment decision, ¯rms will be allowed to adjust prices for several periods.
Therefore, I will denote them as price changes within a promotion cam-
paign. Particularly, in the experiment, within each promotion campaign,
¯rms simultaneously decide for ¯ve consecutive periods on prices. This
allows us to analyze the degree of price collusion at the beginning, in
the middle and at the end of a promotion campaign. Notice that the
setting does not enable ¯rms to communicate or to form contracts on in-
vestments; today, cooperative advertising of ¯rms is the rare exception.
3Thus my setting will measure the \pure" relation between the degree of
price collusion and the degree of investment collusion.
The experimental results are two-fold. In the environment, where
the size of the investment spillovers is lower than the size of the price
spillovers, a higher degree of investment collusion facilitates price col-
lusion for experienced players (i.e., in later periods of the experiment).
Furthermore, collusion is built up subsequently over the promotion cam-
paign, that is, a higher degree of price collusion is induced by a higher
degree of investment collusion in the middle and at the end, but not at
the the beginning of the promotion campaign. On the contrary, in the
environment, where the size of the investment spillovers is higher than
the size of the price spillovers, a higher degree of investment collusion
negatively in°uences the degree of price collusion. If at all, players be-
have semi-collusively, that is, they collude on advertising expenditures,
but compete in prices. Compared with the environment where invest-
ment spillovers are high, the overall degree of collusion for both variables
is higher when investment spillovers are low.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 intro-
duces the theoretical model. Section 3 reports the experimental setting
and discusses research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the results of the
series of laboratory experiments. Finally, Section 5 concludes the article.
2 The model
As the theoretical benchmark for my experiment serves an adaptation
of the duopoly market for di®erentiated products applied by Suetens
(2007). Selling di®erentiated products, two ¯rms compete over prices
for a ¯nite number of periods, t = 1;:::T. Firm i and its competitor ¡i















i denotes the price of ¯rm i in period t, pt
¡i the competitor's
price in period t, and ® the degree of price spillovers, 0 < ® < 1. The
variable At
i denotes i's market size in period t. It is assumed that ¯rms
can invest in advertising activities which increase their market size, as
well as their competitor's. Let mt
i (mt
¡i) denote ¯rm i's investment (the
competitor's investment) in period t and A0 the initial market size, then
i's market size is de¯ned as
A
t





4where ¯, 0 < ¯ < 1, characterizes the degree of investment spillovers
between the product of i and ¡i.1 Thus, advertisements of ¯rm i also
increase the market size for ¯rm ¡i's product, and vice versa. Impor-
tantly, ¯rms' decisions are restricted such that they are not allowed to
change mt
i for a ¯xed number of periods, w. After each decision on in-
vestments, ¯rms make w price decisions where the investment remains
unchanged, that is, mt
i = m
t+1
i = ::: = m
t+w
i for t = 1;w+1;2w+1;:::.
Therefore, I will denote investment decisions as promotion campaigns
lasting for several periods.
With respect to ¯rms' payo®s, I assume that ¯rms have a linear
production cost function and a quadratic cost function for advertising.
Replacing the quantities by the demand function yields for ¯rm i in















where c denotes the marginal cost for production and k the cost param-
eter for investments, respectively.2
Firms play a two-stage game. In the ¯rst stage, they simultaneously
choose investments and then, knowing the vector of investment choices,
they simultaneously set their prices. Let us solve the game by backward
induction. For given investments, both ¯rms will choose prices accord-
ing to their best reply function. This will lead to the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for prices in each price-setting period. Partial deriva-
tion of the pro¯t with respect to prices of ¯rm i and ¯rm ¡i yields an










¡i + c): (4)
Likewise, both ¯rms will choose investments according to their best reply
function anticipating optimal behavior of their competitors. Substitu-
tion the price in the pro¯t function (3) with the equilibrium price accord-
ing to equation (4), and maximization with respect to investments leads
to the symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for investments mN





1 ¡ ¹ 2
2
A0(2 + ®) ¡ c(2 ¡ ® ¡ ®2)
4 ¡ ®2 ; (5)
1Notice that I model two complementary investments. For an analysis of substi-
tutive investments, see, e.g., Nagel & Vriend (1999).




3Notice that the subgame perfect equilibrium allows asymmetric prices if invest-
ments are asymmetric. However, if both players simultaneously optimize invest-
ments, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium yields symmetric investments, and,
consequently, leads to a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium price.
5where ¹1 = 2k ¡
2+®¯
4¡®2, and ¹2 =
2¯+®
4¡®2.
A second benchmark solution is o®ered by prices and investments
that jointly maximize the pro¯t of both ¯rms. Although experiments
frequently observe some degree of price collusion, this benchmark is not
an equilibrium in the strict game-theoretic sense, since ¯rms interact for
a ¯nite number of periods. Assuming that ¯rms collude in price setting,
partial derivation of the joined pro¯t function of ¯rm i and ¯rm ¡i with




i + (1 ¡ ®)c
2 ¡ 2®
: (6)
If ¯rms expect to collude in the w price-setting periods, they replace
the price in the pro¯t function (3) with collusive price according to
equation (6). Maximizing the sum of both pro¯t functions with respect




(1 + ¯)(A0 + ®c ¡ c)
4k(1 ¡ ®) ¡ (1 + ¯)2: (7)
Both the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in prices/investments
and collusive pricing/investing describe two extreme points in the price-
investment space. One alternative that has been frequently discussed
in the literature, are semi-collusive markets (e.g., Fershtman & Muller,
1986, Kamien et al., 1992). Here, ¯rms cooperate in one dimension, for
instance research or advertising expenditures, while they compete in an-
other dimension, typically prices. Applying this idea to a semi-collusive
market where ¯rms compete in prices but collude on investments requires
that I introduce the price pN in the pro¯t function (3). Maximization
of the sum of both pro¯t functions with respect to investments leads to






1+¯ )(A0 + c) ¡ ®c
2k + 2(1 ¡ ®)¹ 2





Summarizing the results, one obtains pC > pN and mC > mS > mN.
3 Hypotheses and experimental procedure
For the experiment, the parameter values of the model are speci¯ed as
c = 1, k = 2, A0 = 6, T = 60, and w = 5. Therefore, a promotion
campaign lasts for ¯ve periods, while players decide twelve times on
6Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks for prices and investments
mN mS mC pN pC
low 1.17 2.49 3.09 5.68 10.52
high 1.28 5.68 8.42 6.12 20.82
investments. With respect to spillover e®ects, I introduce two treatment
condition denoted as low and high. In both settings, the degree of
price spillover remains constant at ® = 0:5. In the low condition ¯ =
0:3, that is, the investment spillover is weaker than the price spillover,
whereas, in the high condition, the investment spillover ¯ = 0:7, that
is, the investment spillover is higher than the price spillover.
The theoretical analysis shows that higher investment spillover in-
creases the incentives for collusion considerably, while changing the Nash
equilibria only slightly (i.e., @mN
@¯ < @mC
@¯ ). Particularly, given the ex-
perimental parameters, mC increases from 3.09 (low) to 8.42 (high),
whereas mN increases from 1.17 (low) to 1.28 (high). Accordingly,
pro¯ts for collusion are more than doubled (from 26.2 to 54.5), but re-
main approximately the same for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(19.2 versus 22.9). All theoretical benchmarks for prices and investments
corresponding to the parameter values are reported in Table 1. Notice
that empirical studies challenge the theoretical results. Research on in-
vestments in product- or process-enhancing technology has found that
the degree of cooperation decreases when investment spillovers are high
(e.g., Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002, Kaiser, 2002). Interpreting adver-
tising expenditures as product-enhancing technology, one can speculate
that decreasing (¯nancial) incentives facilitates a higher degree of invest-
ment collusion under experimental conditions. To resolve the conjecture
I will test the following hypothesis.
H1: The degree of investment collusion is higher in the high than in the
low condition.
In order to explore the in°uence between the degree of investment
collusion and the degree of price collusion, I will de¯ne two measures for







mC ¡ mN ; (9)
where ~ mt
i denotes the experimentally observed investment of player i in
period t. Note that ·t
i = 0 indicates ~ mt
i = mN and ·t
i = 1 indicates
~ mt
i = mC.
7When de¯ning the degree of price collusion, one has to consider that
players are informed on investments of both ¯rms before they choose
prices; the degree of price collusion are functions of ~ mt
i and ~ mt
¡i. Thus,




















¡i)) is calculated using equation (4) (equation (6)) for the
investments in period t. Again, one ¯nds ¸t
i = 0 for ~ pt
i = pN and
¸t
i = 1 for ~ pt
i = pC given the actually observed investments ~ mt
i; ~ mt
¡i. The
two measures will allow us to analyze the e®ect of investment collusion
on price collusion. That is, if players deviate from the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium and collude in investments, does this facilitate a higher
degree of price collusion? On the other hand, referring to the concept of
semi-collusive markets, tacit investment collusion may not in°uence the
degree of price collusion at all; players may collude in investments, but
compete over prices. To analyze the e®ect, I introduce
H2: A high degree of investment collusion, ·t
i, corresponds with high
degree of price collusion, ¸t
i.
I will test H2 for three di®erent \points" of the promotion campaign:
at the beginning of a promotion campaign (i.e., in the period of the
investment decision), in the middle of a promotion campaign (i.e., in the
third period of the promotion campaign), and at the end of a promotion
campaign (i.e., in the period before new investment decisions are made).
One may speculate whether prices decrease or increase more likely in
the course of a promotion campaign. The ¯rst case suggests that players
learn subsequently to play their best responses, whereas the second case
suggests that price collusion is built up subsequently.
Experiments were conducted in the laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute Jena of economics, Germany, in spring 2005.4 In total, 48 sub-
jects, mostly undergraduate students from the University of Jena in their
third or fourth year of studying mathematics, natural sciences, or eco-
nomics, participated in the experiment. Each subject participated only
in one treatment condition; 12 player pairs participated in the low con-
dition, 12 player pairs in the high condition. As the market mechanism
is rather complex, only experienced subjects who had previously com-
pleted at least four experiments (but no oligopoly experiment) partici-
pated in this experiment. Instructions were handed out to participants
4They were computerized using the software package zTree (Fischbacher, 2007);
subjects were recruited using the software package ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
8and read out aloud thereafter.5 Participants' questions concerning the
experiments were then answered privately by the instructors. To check
their full understanding of the instructions, participants were then asked
to answer a multiple-choice questionnaire. Before participants answered
the questionnaire, it was made clear that there was no competition in
answering the questions, but that the purpose was to enhance the un-
derstanding of the experimental rules. Wrong answers were privately
explained and corrected before the experiment started. During the ex-
periment and for answering the questionnaire, subjects were provided
with a simple calculator, pen, and paper.
At the beginning of the experiment, two anonymous players ran-
domly formed a pair that remained matched for the entire 60 periods.
In the ¯rst and every ¯fth consecutive period, subjects were simultane-
ously asked to choose the investment level; values could range between
0 and 9, with 0.01 as the smallest incremental. Subjects knew that for
the following four periods, they could not change this value. Then, play-
ers were informed about their own and their competitor's investment.
Players then simultaneously determined their prices; values could range
between 0 and 25, with 0.01 as the smallest incremental. Finally, sub-
jects were informed on their own payo® as well as their competitor's price
and payo®. At the end of the experiment, accumulated pro¯ts were con-
verted at an exchange rate of 120 units = 1 Euro. Before the experiment
started, subjects were asked to agree on covering potential, accumulated
losses across the entire 60 periods by clerical work at the institute. All
subjects agreed, but none accumulated losses. For playing 60 periods,
subjects needed approximately 90 minutes (including the time needed
for questionnaire) and earned on average 9.93 Euros (standard deviation
2.48 Euros) in the high and 7.63 Euros (standard deviation 1.89 Euros)
in the low condition.
4 Experimental results
I will ¯rst provide an overview of the data by means of average ¯gures,
while then comparing the degree of investment collusion across treat-
ment conditions and the relation between investment and price collusion
in greater detail. Figure 1 shows in the left column the development
of average investments for the high condition, and in the right column
the development of average investments for the low condition over pe-
riods; the dotted black horizontal line indicates the Nash investment
levels, while the grey lines the average § one standard deviation. Over-
all, average investments are close to the mN, but the ¯gures suggest
5Instructions are provided in the Appendix.
9that average investment decreases when investment spillovers increase.
Indeed, the statistical comparison shows a signi¯cant di®erence between
the average investments in low, 1.24 and in high, 1.06.6
Figure 1: Promotion investments in (a) low and (b) high











































When analyzing average prices for the two treatment conditions, re-
sults are similar. Considering the range of potential prices, both are also
close to the Nash equilibrium given Nash equilibrium investment.7 The
development of prices is shown in Figure 2, left column low and right
column high, where the dotted horizontal lines indicate the Nash price
level for the Nash level of investments and the grey lines the average
§ one standard deviation. Unlike investments, average prices do not
di®er signi¯cantly across treatment conditions (5.66 for low and 5.71
for high).8 Thus, although the low condition yields against theoretical
predictions on average higher investments than the high condition, this
does not lead to signi¯cant di®erences in average prices.
To test H1 for investments, I normalize investments ~ mt
i according to
·t
i as de¯ned in equation (9). Apparently, ·t
i = 1 indicates full collusion
6p < 0:001, Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing period averages, two-sided.
7A precise rating for the degree of price collusion respecting the actual investments
chosen by both players will be provided below.
8p = 0:45, Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing period averages, two-sided.
10Figure 2: Prices in (a) low and (b) high































on investments, while 0 < ·t
i < 1 indicates some degree of investment
collusion. Finally, ·t
i · 0 shows no collusion on investments, and ·t
i > 1
non-optimal over-investment with respect to joint pro¯t maximization.
Notice that ·t
i(mS) = 0:69 in the low and ·t
i(mS) = 0:62 in the high
condition. I will classify ·t
i with respect to categories kx, where x =
f¡1=6;1=6;3=6;5=6;7=6;9=6g denotes the upper bound of disjunctive
categories. That is, if ·t
i · ¡1=6 ·t
i 2 k¡1=6, if ¡1=6 < ·t
i · 1=6
·t
i 2 k1=6, and so forth. Hence, mN lies in the center of category k1=6,
mC lies in the center of category k7=6, while mS lies approximately in the
center of category k5=6 (for both treatment conditions). Table 2 shows
the number of investment choices for categories kx.
Based on the categorization results, I have to reject H1. Increas-
ing the investment spillover e®ect in the high condition does not lead
to an increasing degree of collusive investments. Rather, almost all in-
vestments are classi¯ed in the k1=6 category in the high condition, while
there is considerably more variance in the classi¯cation of investments in
the low condition. Overall, the experimental data tentatively supports
the empirical observations. The average degree of collusion is lower in
the high than in the low condition; averages for low increase from
¡0:036 in the ¯rst half of periods to 0:014 in the second half of peri-
ods, whereas averages for the high remain at ¡0:037 for the ¯rst half
11Table 2: Categorization of investments according to kx
k¡1=6 k1=6 k3=6 k5=6 k7=6 k9=6
period 1-30 low 58 40 32 4 4 6
high 2 138 2 2 0 0
period 31-60 low 42 52 38 0 10 2
high 0 142 2 0 0 0
period 1-60 low 100 92 70 4 14 8
high 2 280 4 2 0 0
Notice: Categories kx classify investments such that x denotes the upper bound of
disjunctive categories.
of periods and ¡0:04 for the second half. Notice that there is a weakly
signi¯cant di®erence for the second half of periods between treatment
conditions,9 but no signi¯cant di®erence for the ¯rst half and for the
average of all periods (¡0:01 under low compared to ¡0:038 under
high).10
Now let us contrast ·t
i with the ¸t
i at the beginning, in the middle and
at the end of the promotions campaign (i.e., the ¯rst, third, and last price
decision after investments have been adjusted). The ¯rst panel of Figure
3 shows the experimentally observed ·t
i=¸t
i combinations as gray dots
at the beginning of a promotion campaign, the second panel the ·t
i=¸t
i
combinations in the middle of a promotion campaign, and the third panel
the ·t
i=¸t
i combinations at the end of a promotion campaign, where i.
provides the results for the low condition and ii. the results for the high





i(pC) combination, and small crosses indicate the
·t
i(mS)=¸t
i(pN) combination (characterizing semi-cooperative markets).
With respect to the ·t
i dimension, Figure 3 shows the large concentra-
tion of investments at the Nash equilibrium level in the high condition.
In contrast, investments are less concentrated in the low condition.11
With respect to the ¸t
i dimension, there is not such a clustering for any
treatment condition. However, I ¯nd for prices some convergence to the
Nash equilibrium over the promotion campaigns in the high condition,
9p = 0:09, Mann-Whitney-U rank sum test comparing period averages, two-sided.
10p = 0:70 and p = 0:13, Mann-Whitney-U rank sum tests comparing period
averages, two-sided.
11Recall that investments do not change within a promotion campaign so that all
panels are identical for the ·t
i dimension.
12Figure 3: Experimentally observed ·t
i and ¸t
i combinations










































































































































13since the average distance of prices to the Nash equilibrium decreases
weakly signi¯cant over the promotion campaign. No signi¯cant decrease
can be found in the low condition. Speci¯cally, at the beginning of
the promotion campaign, the mean ¸t
i is ¡0:12 in the high condition
(¡0:096 in the low condition), increases to ¡0:054 (¡0:075) in the mid-
dle of the campaign, and remains at ¡0:056 (¡0:072) at the end of the
campaign. The di®erence between ¸t
i at the beginning and the end of
the campaign is signi¯cant for the high condition, but insigni¯cant for
the low condition.12 Thus, in extension of result for investments, I ¯nd
also for prices a stronger convergence to the best respond in the high
than in the low condition. Overall, I ¯nd the following
Result 1: Increasing the investment spillovers tends to decrease the dis-
tance to the Nash equilibrium both for investments and prices.
In order to explore the relation between the two variables, I will
regress the the degree of price collusion on the degree of investment
collusion controlling for other factors. Speci¯cally, I will estimate the





i¯ + &i;t , (11)
where xi denotes the matrix of regressors, ¯ for the vector of (true)
coe±cients and &i;t for the unobserved individual random e®ect. I es-
timate the model for the low and the high condition separately. As
independent variable, ·t
i is tested. Furthermore, the di®erent points of
the promotion campaign are considered by means of the two dummy
variables ±middle=end and ±end. The ¯rst variable is de¯ned such that
±middle=end = 1 if the pricing decision comes either from the middle or
the end of the promotion campaign and 0 otherwise, while ±end = 1
if the pricing decision comes from the end of the promotion campaign
and 0 otherwise. Thus, signi¯cant coe±cients for the ¯rst variable (or
interactions with this variable) indicate signi¯cant di®erences in pric-
ing behavior between the beginning of the promotion campaign and the
later points of the promotion campaign, whereas signi¯cant coe±cients
for the second variable (or interactions with this variable) indicates sig-
ni¯cant di®erences in behavior at the end of the promotion campaign.
Finally, the variable t = 1;:::;60 captures temporal e®ects like learning
between early periods and later periods of the experiment.
According to the hypothesis H2, one expects the coe±cient of ·t
i to
be signi¯cantly positive. Particularly, the hypothesis suggests that the
positive correspondence between ·t
i and ¸t
i holds for the beginning, the
middle and the end of the promotion campaign. On the other hand, if
12p = 0:077 for high and p = 0:79 for low, Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing
period averages, two-sided.
14we assume that players learn subsequently to play their best response,
the coe±cients of ·t
i £ ±middle=end and ·t
i £ ±end should be signi¯cantly
negative. On the contrary, if price collusion is built up subsequently,
the two coe±cients are expected to be signi¯cantly positive. Table 3
reports the results for the two models, low and high, respectively. Stars
indicate the signi¯cance of coe±cients;13 the number of observation (n)
is reported. Finally, the ¯tness of the models is suggested by the log-
likelihood (logLik) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
The estimated coe±cient for the low condition shows that the de-
gree of price collusion is initially negative, that is, the constant term
is signi¯cantly negative, but increases with progress of the experiment,
that is, t is signi¯cantly positive. In contrast to H2 the coe±cient of
·t
i is insigni¯cantly positive. This result indicates that a higher degree
of investment collusion does not signi¯cantly induce a higher degree of
price collusion. Yet, the (weakly) signi¯cantly positive coe±cient of
·t
i £±middle=end £t shows for later periods of the experiment that players
learn to collude subsequently in the middle and at the end of the pro-
motion campaign. Here, a higher degree of investment collusion leads
to a higher degree of price collusion. Therefore, for experienced players,
price collusion is built up subsequently; investment collusion facilitates
price collusion in the middle and at the end of the promotion campaign.
Overall, the results suggest the following in the low condition: Higher
degrees of investment collusion do not facilitate higher degrees of price
collusion. However, in later periods of the experiment, players increase
the degree of collusion over the promotion campaign.
For the high condition, the signi¯cant negative constant term indi-
cates also initially a negative degree of price collusion. Again, as shown
by the signi¯cantly positive coe±cients of t and ±middle=end, the degree of
collusion increases both over the promotion campaign and in the course
of the experiment. However, with respect to the correspondence between
the degree of investment collusion and the degree of price collusion, one
¯nds the opposite results to the estimation for the low condition. The
signi¯cantly negative coe±cient of ·t
i indicates that a higher degree of
investment collusion leads to a lower degree of price collusion. Thus,
in the high condition, increasing the investments intensi¯es the price
competition. If players collude on investments, which has rarely been
observed in the data, this leads to semi-collusive markets where players
compete in pricing.
To summarize the regression analysis, the estimation results partly
support H2:
13¤¤¤ signi¯cant on a 0:01 level, ¤¤ signi¯cant on a 0:05 level, ¤ signi¯cant on a 0:1
level.













i £ ±middle=end ¡0:25 0:71
(0:15) (0:70)
·t
i £ ±end 0:11 0:86
(0:16) (0:73)
·t
i £ t 0:002 0:02
(0:004) (0:02)
·t
i £ ±middle=end £ t 0:008¤ ¡0:008
(0:005) (0:02)
·t







Notice: ¤¤¤ signi¯cant on a 0:01 level, ¤¤ signi¯cant on a 0:05 level, ¤ signi¯cant on
a 0:1 level; logLik of null model: ¡660 (low) and ¡712 (high).
16Result 2a: In the low condition, a high degree of investment collusion
leads to a higher degree of price collusion for experienced players; price
collusion is built up subsequently over the promotion campaign.
However, I have to reject H2 for the environment with high investment
spillovers:
Result 2b: In the high condition, a high degree of investment collusion
leads to a lower degree of price collusion; if at all, one ¯nds a semi-
collusive investment level.
Overall, the experimental results suggest that the investment spillovers
crucially in°uence collusion with respect to both dimensions, advertising
expenditures and prices. Along several empirical studies (e.g., Kaiser,
2002), I ¯nd a lower degree of investment and price collusion when in-
vestment spillovers are high. Thus, high investment spillovers increase
the competition as prices and investments are closer to subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. At most, they collude on investments but compete
over prices. To the contrary, when investment spillovers are low, a higher
degree of investment collusion leads to a higher degree of price collusion
for experienced players. Moreover, the degree of price collusion increases
subsequently over the promotion campaign.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the relation between the degree of price collusion
and the degree of collusion on advertising expenditures. For this pur-
pose, an experimental duopoly game was tested, where participants were
asked to specify simultaneously investments for promotion campaigns.
Within each promotion campaign, players had to specify prices repeat-
edly. I controlled the degree of price collusion at the beginning, in the
middle and at the end of the promotion campaign. Experiments were
run in two environments, a treatment condition where the size of the
investment spillovers is lower than the size of the price spillovers, and a
treatment condition where the investment spillovers is higher than the
price spillovers. The theoretical analysis shows that the ¯nancial in-
centives for collusion increases enormously in the second environment
compared with the ¯rst one.
Unlike the theoretical suggestion, in the experiment players collude
signi¯cantly more in the treatment condition with low than with high
investment spillovers. On the contrary, high investment spillovers seem
to decrease the distance to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This
¯nding supports previous empirical evidence on the relation between
collusive research and developments and the size of the technological
spillover (e.g., Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002).
For the relation between investment and price collusion, the econo-
17metric analysis indicates that a higher degree of investment collusion
facilitates price collusion for experienced players in the low condition.
Particularly in later periods of the experiment, collusion is built up sub-
sequently over the promotion campaign. In the high condition, however,
I ¯nd the opposite e®ect; a higher degree of investment collusion in°u-
ences negatively the degree of price collusion. If at all, players behave
semi-collusively, that is, they collude on advertising expenditures, but
compete in prices.
In general, my ¯ndings suggest an important quali¯cation for the
propagation of semi-collusive markets. Analyses have to draw profound
attention to the size of the investment spillovers as it is an important
factor determining the behavior of market participants. There is con-
siderable empirical evidence for semi-collusion (e.g., Steen & S¿rgard,
1999, ¯nd that Norwegian cement producers compete on capacities, but
collude on prices). The current results suggest that these markets are
characterized by large investment spillovers. On the contrary, the lab-
oratory evidence provides a warning for public authorities dealing with
price collusion: price collusion is facilitated by investment collusion when
spillovers are low. That is, collusion likely occurs although the joint mar-
ket structure is less likely to be detected.
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20Appendix: Instructions14
Thank you for participating in our experiment. We kindly ask you to re-
frain from any public statements and attempts to communicate directly
with other participants. If you violate this rule, we have to exclude you
from the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand,
and one of the persons who runs the experiment will come to your place
and answer your questions. Please read these instructions carefully. In
this experiment, you will earn money based on repeated decisions. How
much you will earn depends on your decisions as well as the decisions of
another participant.
You will repeatedly interact with another, anonymous participant for
60 periods. The instructions are identical for all participants. The other
participant will be randomly assigned to you and will remain with you
for the entire experiment.
In this experiment, you as well as the other participant have to sell
a product on a market. Your pro¯t equals the number of sold entities
of your product multiplied by the price, minus production costs. You
have to decide on the price of the product. The price can range between
0 and 25 ECU, with 0.01 as the smallest incremental step. The higher
the price you choose, the smaller the number of sold entities per period.
Whenever the price exceeds a certain level, you cannot sell any entity
at all. However, the number of sold entities increases if your competitor
increases the price for her product. In summary, your number of sold
entities (qown) equals
qown = 6 ¡ pown + 0:5pother;
where pown denotes the price you choose and pother the price the other
participant chooses. Note that for each entity you sell, there are pro-
duction costs of 1 ECU. Therefore, your pro¯t (Gown) is
Gown = qown £ pown ¡ 1 £ qown:
In every ¯fth period, you have the opportunity to invest in your
product. We denote your investments as mown. Investments can range
between 0 and 9, with 0.01 as the smallest incremental step. Although
you can only change your investments in every ¯fth period, they increase
the number of sold entities in every period. Additionally, the investments
of the other participant increase the number of sold entities of your
product. The number of sold entities of your product (qown) equals
qown = 6 + mown + 0:3mother ¡ pown + 0:5pother;
14Author's translation of the German instructions for the low condition.
21where mother denotes the investments of the other participant.15 How-
ever, in every period, investments also cost 2(mown)2 (not only in every
¯fth period when you can change them). You participate in the in-
vestments of the other participant without any costs. Thus, your pro¯t
equals
Gown = qown £ pown ¡ 1 £ qown ¡ 2(mown)
2:
Please consider that you may accumulate losses due to unfavorable in-
vestment choices. If you earn a negative total pro¯t throughout the
entire experiment, you will be asked to pay back this amount by doing
clerical work at our institute (120 ECU = 1 hour). If you do not accept
this rule, please leave the experiment now.
In every ¯rst out of ¯ve periods (i.e., in periods 1, 6, 11,...), you will
be asked to specify your investments. You will not be asked for this
in the subsequent 4 periods. Please note that the level of investments
cannot be changed for these 4 periods, though you have to carry the
costs for them. In each period, you are then informed on the level of
investments you chose as well as that chosen by the other participant.
Additionally, you are informed on the investments and prices chosen in
the previous period. Then you have to choose the price for your product
in this period. Finally, we inform you on your pro¯t in this period,
the pro¯t of the other participant, and the accumulated pro¯ts. At the
end of the experiment, we will exchange all ECUs you earned in the 60
periods at a rate of 120 ECU = 1 Euro.
Before the ¯rst round starts, we will ask you several questions con-
cerning the rules of this experiment in a questionnaire. Please answer
them correctly. One of the persons who runs the experiment will come
to your place and clarify incorrect answers.
15In the high condition the equation equals qown = 6+mown+0:7mother ¡pown+
0:5pother.
22